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PREFACE 
These diverse essays consider the ways a variety of ideas, works, and prac- 
tices reveal uniquely American themes. They delve into American life in all 
the varied senses the term epiphanies might suggest: bodyings forth of ideas, 
showings, manifestations, even visionary appearances. I harvest ideas from 
familiar settings and more obscure and unexpected terrain—including my 
own epiphanies—to expose neglected masters, narratives, and artifacts, and 
to reveal central motifs of American life in a new light. 
The “quintessential American” can be found in exemplary people or their 
works, to be sure—a number are portrayed here. But that person can also be 
found in the Joneses next door, or in your own back yard or living room—or 
mine, or in your local tavern, the nearest mall, nuclear bombs, or even in 
The Parthenon in Nashville, as I discovered to my amazement on a couple 
of occasions. 
The essays range freely in style as well as content over a broad, varied ter- 
ritory and are not intended to develop a single story line. I am not attempt- 
ing a linear tour of American culture, but rather what Kenneth Burke called 
“perspective by incongruity,” of lateral and nonlinear developments both in 
the ordering of chapters and the organizing within them. Feel free to roam 
the book, nonsequentially. The term epiphany (Greek epiphaino, “to appear 





connotes “perspective by incongruity,” wherein an unexpected illumination 
or manifestation brings a new way of seeing, kaleidoscopically. 
Moving, for example, from considering nuclear America of the 1950s in 
chapters 2 and 3 to early twentieth-century St. Louis and Chicago in chapters 
4 and 5, backtracks how the power structure that emerged in the fifties was 
already prefigured in the dynamos and cultural energies Henry Adams pre- 
sciently described. It is a peeling away of historical materials rather than a 
chronological narrative of them, in order to provide, as Lewis Mumford once 
put it, a “useable history” through which to consider contemporary Ameri- 
can culture. 
Chapter 4, “The Hunter-Gatherers’ World’s Fair,” juxtaposes Geronimo 
and Ota Benga at the St. Louis World’s Fair with Max Weber and Henry Adams 
at the same fair: quite an unlikely quartet! Yet incongruity through juxtapo- 
sition provides a way to develop the story of Ota Benga and to contrast the 
hunter-gatherers with the civilized power structure that confronted them. 
One of the major points of the chapter is to view America and modern civili- 
zation through the very different eyes of the hunter-gatherers assembled at 
that world’s fair. 
Epiphanies are not only subjects for describing; they also constitute a var- 
ied form of expression. James Joyce’s free-associative writing from the inner 
life of some of his characters in Ulysses and other works is but one example 
of the boundless possibilities of epiphany as form. Joyce’s narrator in Ste- 
phen Hero offers Stephen’s view: “By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual 
manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memo- 
rable phase of the mind itself. He believed that it was for the man of letters 
to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves 
are the most delicate and evanescent of moments.” Joyce manifests one per- 
spective here, but there are many others, some not so sudden, some not so 
spiritual—all radiant, perhaps, but some radioactive as well. 
I use the form of epiphany as a means of being free, free in the sense in 
which Ralph Waldo Emerson described the American scholar: “The world,— 
this shadow of the soul, or other me, lies wide around. Its attractions are the 
keys which unlock my thoughts and make me acquainted with myself. I run 
eagerly into this resounding tumult. I grasp the hands of those next [to] me, 
and take my place in the ring to suffer and to work, taught by an instinct, 
that so shall the dumb abyss be vocal with speech.” The American scholar of 
today, sadly, has become a quite different creature from the one envisioned 
by Emerson. Ingrown with expertise, hidebound by “peer-reviewed” jugger- 
nauts and university standards designed to insure bureaucratic conformity, 




thinking thrives. Reader be warned: I prefer to take the “life” part of “intel- 
lectual life” seriously, wherever it takes me. 
In the rise of technological and acquisitive materialism in twentieth- and 
twenty-first-century America, one recurrent theme is the tension produced 
between the ideals of technicalism and consumerism versus that of a demo- 
cratic public life. Early chapters focus on some key symbols of materialism in 
post–World War II America, including the automobile and its transformative 
effects on social life; radioactivity as master symbol for the materialization 
of the transcendent in the twentieth century; and on the increasing influence 
of mechanical and electronic domestic devices of all sorts in the home (par- 
ticularly relating to the mass media and entertainment industries). 
I view America since World War II as problematically guided by a power- 
oriented culture, which, in the names of national security and convenience, 
has tended to reshape America toward a hierarchical machine model of so- 
ciety—toward megatechnic America—and against the requirements of demo- 
cratic community. The history of nuclear power alone, from the increasingly 
lethal and expensive development of weapons in the cold war and the ways 
in which they dictated American foreign policy, to the promises of virtually 
cost-free energy, suggest that radioactivity has functioned as the invisible 
specter of the old American dream of the New Jerusalem. 
Radioactivity, which perhaps defines twentieth-century materialism as 
bronze, silver, and stone did for earlier ages (and which silicon may do for the 
twenty-first century), proved to be a seemingly immaterial but deadly power 
that we have yet to harness. Yet both public and domestic life in a democratic 
society demand that technical products and the technical way of thinking 
serve as means to the good life, and not usurp their place as means to become 
the intended or unintended goals of life. Hence a crucial question dealt with 
throughout the book, despite a wide range of content, is how American cul- 
ture—and indeed world culture—can regain human autonomy in the face of 
a seemingly irresistible automatic culture. 
Conservative Republican president Dwight D. Eisenhower, former gen- 
eral and allied military forces commander in World War II, used the term the 
military-industrial complex in his farewell speech as president on January 17, 
1961, to describe the dangerous expansion of bureaucratic purposes taking 
on a profit-making life of their own. The Left later used the term to criticize 
the United States as an out-of-control imperial power during the Vietnam 
War. Despite the criticisms, the power complex has continued to expand its 
reach both globally and especially in America, outwardly and inwardly, so 
I have updated the term to the postdemocratic military-industrial-academic- 




Currently, American culture—and global culture more generally—seems 
bent on extending machine ways of living without limit. The epiphany of 
the robot as deus ex machina—the god out of the machine—is a delusion 
that may prove our final undoing, as life becomes ever more dominated by 
electronic devices. Although techno-mania is a defining feature of American 
life, there is another America, rooted in the vision of the organic, that has 
inspired Americans since long before there were Americans or America, and 
that continues to animate the American vision today. 
The same American culture that has promoted “automatic” ways of liv- 
ing also provides alternatives, ranging across the possibilities for meaning 
found in the artifacts and activities of domestic and public life, the problem- 
atic quest for spontaneity in a range of postwar arts and in relation to earlier 
American artists and thinkers, and unlikely connections between American 
themes and non-American artists and thinkers. 
One sees this, for example, in the uniquely American visions of Lewis 
Mumford (1895–1990) and Wharton Esherick (1883–1970), both of whom could 
be regarded as exemplars and nodal points of American culture. Esherick, 
who has been called ‘‘the dean of modern American furniture design,’’ was 
a twentieth-century Thoreau in wood and a friend of writers Sherwood An- 
derson and Theodore Dreiser and of architect Louis Kahn, among others. Al- 
though central to the emergence of the “art furniture” movement in America, 
and a major influence on his younger contemporaries such as Sam Maloof 
and Wendell Castle, Esherick has only recently begun to be recognized. Heav- 
ily illustrated “coffee table” books on furniture are now mentioning him as a 
central figure, but are only beginning to show photographs of his work. His 
life and place in American culture has languished in obscurity. Of particular 
interest to me is Esherick’s vision of domestic life, realized in the structure 
and life-history of his own home. 
Similarly, the actual home of Lewis Mumford in Amenia, New York, 
where I visited with him and his wife Sophia over a few years before his 
death, provides a take-off point for recollections of and reflections on his life 
and work as a public intellectual. Here I am primarily interested in Mumford 
as a manifestation of American culture as well as a thinker now strangely 
neglected. His work extended far beyond his better-known writings on cities 
and architecture, and included a general philosophy of life. Mumford has 
been criticized by some as a Luddite, by others as excessively pessimistic 
and moralistic. Yet a number of his dark observations resonate with those of 
Herman Melville and philosopher Charles Peirce, two other Americans who 
seemed to break with American optimism. Chapter 12 explores why such 
xiii 
PREFACE 
views can be seen as distinctively American, and what the limitations and 
possibilities of such visions are. 
Early chapters deal with embodiments of public and domestic life in 
America and of the tensions in maintaining each in the face of a culture ori- 
ented toward mass consumption and automatic convenience. These chapters 
include discussions of a number of public symbols, such as the Vietnam Vet- 
erans Memorial and the International Airstream Travel Trailer convention, 
of how the artifacts and activities of the domestic environment symbolize 
“home-life,” and of the dual public and private place of electronic media in 
what I am terming pax electronica, the “peace” induced by the matrix of elec- 
tronic devices that increasingly permeate everyday life and consciousness in 
America and globally. Pax electronica as a pox electronica. 
The theme of a pax electronica also appears in later chapters that consider 
manifestations of invisibility, immaterial materialism, and secrecy. Radio- 
activity again emerges as a master symbol in American culture since World 
War II, as the invisible specter of the New Jerusalem, along with the cult of 
celebrity and consumption culture. To give one example, a critical analysis of 
the novel His Master’s Voice, by Polish writer Stanislaw Lem, which deals with 
a fictional secret research project modeled after the old Manhattan Project, 
provides a take-off point for my discussions of the place of secrecy in science 
and public life, and of the American victims of nuclear testing, whose num- 
bers by most estimates are greater than the American dead of the Korean, 
Vietnam, and Iraq wars combined. 
Epiphanies, as incandescent manifestations, also include the visionary, 
and I have included, to be true to this aspect of the form, some of my own 
American epiphanies. Our age tends to denigrate the inner life as “merely” 
subjective, as though “insight,” in the literal sense, cannot also be insight- 
ful, opening felt portals to self and world. In my case, visions of a world’s fair, 
of The Parthenon in Nashville, and of hurricanes, made manifest sensings 
of things of which I was not consciously aware, and ideas worth weaving. 
But are they objective knowledge, the modern rational reader might well ask. 
Why do you think the subjective is cleanly separated from the objective, I 
might reply, for all that is now known was first imagined, sensed, and felt, 
however darkly. Read them as openings, not closures, as invitations to run 
eagerly into the resounding tumult. 
1 
1 
THE GREAT BRAIN SUCK 
ignition 
The 1990s ushered in a new phase of postmodern decay in America: virtuality 
as virtue. The year 1990 is a convenient decade marker for the change, when 
superstores begin to blitz already mall-crazed America, when cheap imitation 
ethnic restaurants give way to high quality virtual “local” ethnic restaurant 
franchises—and gluttony spawns an obesity epidemic—when high quality 
superbookstore and supercafe franchises colonize city and mall alike, when 
Americans finally and voluntarily surrender those chunks of time not already 
owned by television to their newly purchased smart typewriter contraptions. 
Could anyone imagine just twenty-five years ago the extent to which mass 
quantities of the leisure classes of the advanced industrial nations would spend 
significant leisure time “typing?” Or “mousing?” 
The great fear of “y2k” was that computers would not function after the new 
millennium began. But that was a minor problem in comparison with the ab- 
sorption of people by machine-system activities. The old vision of the human 
of the future was a spindly creature with an enormous brain. Now we know 
that vision was wrong, because we are making the human of the future right 
now, “it” is already well underway—that pathetic genderless creature—and 





obese, pinheaded creature with huge, thick typing fingers. Evolution has se- 
lected carpal tunnel syndrome as the means of weeding out the mechanically 
weak stock, and the Internet as the means of brain sucking the populace, of in- 
creasing its dependency on externally derived information that bypasses the 
need for actual thinking, feeling, and experiencing. We’ve already witnessed 
the brain suck of checkout attendants, who formerly possessed the ability for 
common arithmetic, by calculating machines. 
More and more information is pumped into the world every minute of 
every day and yet America dumbs down: more and more information about 
the world, and yet people know less and less about it; more and more sources 
of history available and less and less knowledge of history; more and more 
information about the cultures of the world and yet less and less awareness. 
Do people accumulate this information by day, and have it removed, like 
night soil, by dark? There is a vast brain suck occurring. But from where? How 
can you flood brains with information, and by doing so, precisely in the act of 
doing so, suck them dry? 
How is it that we can look at and listen to so much information bombard- 
ing our eyes and ears, yet apparently see not and hear not? It is not simply a 
physiological problem but a cultural and moral one, which involves all the 
fibers of our being, including the physical. It is the same problem, I suppose, 
that causes me misgivings when I see those people in health clubs reading 
on bicycle machines, iPods engaged, abstracted from the pure being of their 
bodies. You know when you look at them that they cycle away more miles on 
those indoor machines than the ones they passed while driving in their auto- 
machines to get to the health club. But these are physiologically measurable 
and paid-for miles. 
My technical term for this neuro-metaphysical disorder is brain suck. It de- 
rives from a techno-culture bent on replacing self-originated experience with 
rationally derived commodity forms, and on colonizing the inner life with 
substitute emotions, embedded to function like Internet “cookies,” linked to 
the system. The result is what might be called, only half-fancifully, “brain- 
oid tissue,” surrogate synapses all linked to and ultimately produced by the 
Great and Powerful Machine. This is not the same as “brain drain,” which 
means the flight of intelligence to other countries. A drain is a leak, but brain 
suck is a kind of vacuuming effect, sucking awareness from one’s life into the 
void of the undead zombie-zone. One might think that this process occurs 
by brainwashing, and in a sense it does. But the chief means by which brain 
suck operates is what I prefer to call brain rinsing, a seemingly kinder, gentler 
approach that is no less effective. Brainwashing is usually through forcible 
punishing torture, aiming at a total conversion. But brain rinsing achieves 
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brain suck piecemeal, usually through repetitive, pleasurable miniactivities, 
none of which alone may be compromising, but all of which together add up 
to a compromised self running on automatic. 
In contrast, by self-originated experience, I mean that the self, though condi- 
tionable and though developed through habits of conduct, involves a sponta- 
neous, sensing reasonableness not reducible to its habits and conditioning, 
one whose purport is self-determination. This self requires bodily involve- 
ment in the moment and the availability of feelings, needs, desires, and goals 
to make sense of that moment. It requires the awareness needed to continue 
to be itself in the moment, that is, to determine itself in its environment as 
a socially autonomous being. I want to explore now some of the varieties of 
brain suck with reference to the colonization of the human self by consump- 





Let us imagine a day in the life of “techno-colonized person,” who, in the spirit 
of H. L. Mencken’s term “boob-oisie,” I will call BIG Zombie. In the American 
version, BIG Zombie moves by machine, spending an average of sixty-seven 
minutes a day for males and forty-four minutes for females a day driving 
an automobile, according to a study by the U.S. Department of Transporta- 
tion.1 BIG Zombie enjoys this time in the auto, and perceives hurtling speedily 
down the road as his or her “time to think and enjoy being alone.” This auto- 
meditative attitude is more pronounced among the young, declines with age, 
and also increases with wealth.2 
Far from the view of modern culture as a purely rationalizing system, there 
is this other side to it, its need to make connection to the human soul. Ameri- 
can consumer culture, for example, represents a fully techno-totemic system 
in place. Do you need to make up a personal name for your automobile when 
it’s already a Mustang, a Stingray, a Cobra, a Jaguar? If you want to display 
your luxus, what better way than through a Lexus? 
The American car system functions as a crucial part of this consumer 
techno-totemic system. It is a pure example of a technical system at work, and 
yet it needs to attach irrational symbols of desire, either predatory or sexual, 
to itself, to a machine. Driving becomes a technical form of hunting or eroti- 
cism or luxury or musical emotion or even meditation, and the auto experi- 
ence is supposed to confer those qualities onto the owner or the driver. 
The word automobile means self-moving, and that is an important part of 




away from the rat race even while you are driving in it, but it is also supposed 
to give you the freedom to move within the social system. 
American culture today highlights the more general battle between auton- 
omy and the automaton. The great dream of the modern era has been to pro- 
vide for and enlarge the autonomy of humankind through technical invention 
and control over the necessities of life. As that dream has been realized it has 
all too frequently revealed itself in diabolical reversal. The vast technical cul- 
ture and wealth of America have not led the way toward the good life, but in- 
stead toward the goods life, toward a reified culture centered in commodities 
rather than citizens, toward an ultimate goal of automatic things and away 
from human autonomy. This is not the necessary outcome of the development 
of technology but the consequence of the withering of human purpose in the 
face of the “magic” of technique. The 1980s signified the new phase of the elec- 
tronics revolution underway, but I would suggest something more sinister. It 
was as if the long-held human tension between fear of and fascination for the 
robotic finally dissolved, as if the fascination for the magic of the automaton 
overwhelmed the understandable fears for its power to alienate the human 
and left only the ideal of a fusion of humans with the powerful instruments of 
the automatic: humanoids, terminators, carbon-based units. 
Perhaps the small child playing with “transformer” robots or video games, 
the larger child mall cruising or earlocked in an iPod or similar audio device, 
the adult in a health club exercising on an electronic bicycle while watching 
a video display of a route or a large screen television set, are all symbols of an 
emergent creature that willingly would prefer to live in “virtual reality” rather 
than the real thing. Yet who can deny the conveniences the machines launched 
in the 1980s and 1990s afford? Still, the question is whether they truly enhance 
autonomy or automatism, and clearly both outcomes are possible. 
Probably you, dear reader, and surely I, would defend the word-processing 
computer as providing greater autonomy. But talk to an office worker whose 
keystrokes are being monitored or who has suffered repetitive-motion dam- 
age. Talk to the marketer or secret police person who may be monitoring which 
Web sites you have visited. What books are the video-game-expert child not 
reading? Consider Morgan Pozgar, the thirteen-year-old girl who won the LG 
National Texting Championship and its $25,000 cash reward in April, 2007, by 
typing the following lines from a Mary Poppins tune on her cell phone in a mere 
fifteen seconds: “Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious! Even though the sound of 
it is something quite atrocious. If you say it loud enough you’ll always sound 
precocious.” The technical information she had absorbed and technical facil- 
ity she had developed to achieve this feat by sending an average of over eight 
thousand text messages a month resulted in a girl with a lot of money and a 
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typical ’tween’s dream of consuming. When asked what she wanted to do with 
the money, she said, “I’m going to go shopping and buy lots of clothes.” She 
wants to go into fashion when she grows up. 
Or consider what a woman college student said after breaking up with a 
boyfriend and fellow student who played video games four hours a day, and 
said he was trying to reduce to fifteen hours a week: “He said he was thinking 
of trying to cut back to fifteen hours a week. I said, ‘Fifteen hours is what I 
spend on my internship, and I get paid $1,300 a month.’ That’s my litmus test 
now: I won’t date anyone who plays video games. It means they’re choosing to  
do something that wastes their time and sucks the life out of them.”3 
What drain does each additional device put on time spent together in 
the home? The fact that the family meal has been increasingly fragmented 
through individualized microwaved meals, through the intrusion of televi- 
sion, through increased dependence on fast-food restaurants ought to be taken 
as a sign of how increasingly difficult it is to do simple activities together, rel- 
atively unintruded upon by high tech. It is now a dietary commonplace that 
meals made at home from scratch are healthier than processed foods, and the 
shared family meal is good for the soul as well as for the body. Yet Americans 
have been shrinking away from homemade meals. This is not simply a class 
issue, as though the poor can only afford unhealthy foods, for the best diets 
in the world tend to be “peasant” diets. It is not cheap rice, beans, and greens 
that are causing massive obesity, but high-fat, high-fructose unhealthy di- 
ets leveraged by the heavily subsidized industrial-food complex, manifest in 
processed foods and especially in fast food, which still remains more expen- 
sive than home cooking. 
The presumed purpose of the high-tech household is to transfer everyday 
necessities—heating, cooking, cleaning, and so forth—to machines, in order 
to increase “leisure time.” Yet leisure is largely a machine activity in America. 
Consider that the average American spent three thousand hours consuming 
media in 1988, of which 1,550 hours were devoted to television, and 1,160 to ra- 
dio. Yet the average American household has steadily increased television time 
over the decades, most recently going from an average of seven hours and sev- 
enteen minutes in 1995 to just under eight hours (seven hours and fifty-eight 
minutes) in 2003 according to Nielson surveys. And this occurred in the decade 
when the epiphany of the computer screen materialized throughout America, 
compounding “screen time.” Exposure to advertising has also expanded dras- 
tically in the past twenty years, as has sexual content of programming. 
These numbing numbers suggest that Americans devote an enormous 
amount of time to the daily habit of listening and watching. Americans 




potatoes,” going on to computer jockey status in the 1990s. Perhaps the 
great tendency to sit—in autos and in front of televisions—was perhaps off- 
set somewhat by a reported rise in the “standing breakfast,” eaten next to 
a kitchen counter, or by stand-up eating in fast food restaurants. But these 
standing and sitting patterns only testify to overly mechanized life. 
As part of the larger dynamics of the modern era, American culture has 
transformed technique from a means to the good life to a virtual goal unto it- 
self, with the result that Americans have increasingly seemed to be willing to 
sacrifice the art and practice and struggles of concrete life to the conveniences 
of abstract technique: to give up the active cultivation of home life to the 
passive consumption of TV, TV dinners, take-out and fast road food; to give 
up multipurpose centers for civic life and local commerce to self-enclosed, 
privatized, behavior-monitoring shopping malls; to surrender the pursuit of 
autonomy to the accumulation of dollars and the identity-confirming rituals 
of consumption. 
In real life, as the expression goes, shit happens. Virtual automatic con- 
sumption culture is designed, in stark contrast, to habituate us to an ideal- 
ized techno-kitsch realm immunized from the necessary baggage of human 
life. To the extent that it does, it sucks from us the anchors of everyday life, 
those problematic face-to-face relations with family, friends, neighbors, and 
co-workers that are anything but ideal, and that, precisely in their limita- 
tions, force us to find our way in a common world. And for people living on 
the edges of sanity, those social anchors may be all that is keeping them from 




The Triumph of Pottersville 
 
In the 1946 Hollywood Christmas film, It’s a Wonderful Life, George Bailey 
(played by Jimmy Stewart), depressed and suicidal, experiences a vision of 
what it would be like if he had never been born. His small town becomes a glit- 
tery sin city, Pottersville, named after the heartless town millionaire. Bailey 
sees that his job as town banker has been crucial in keeping the community 
spirit alive, and not only the economic welfare of his neighbors and fellow 
citizens. He returns from his hopelessness, renewed as the solid-guy-who- 
holds-the-town-together, and succeeds in the end in staving off Pottersville. 
Decency overcomes unbounded capitalistic greed and human baseness. 
Moving from the image of late Depression and wartime America to 1950s 
postwar prosperity America, something far worse happens to the small town 
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myth. In the sci-fi classic Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), Dr. Miles J. Bin- 
nell, the lead character played by Kevin McCarthy, cannot hold the center to- 
gether and loses everything, his town, his patients, his neighbors and friends, 
and even the object of his love, Becky. 
Worse, the town is not lost to the tyrant, but to the postpersonality system 
of emotionless, conforming drones. Just as Vaclav Havel depicted the ascen- 
dance of the posttotalitarian system in communist countries after Stalin’s death, 
we have the coming to being of what could be termed the postdemocratic system 
in America. By posttotalitarian he meant that totalitarianism, far from being 
over, had entered a new phase, shifting from the cult of personality charac- 
terizing the first generation of totalitarianism—with its Stalin, Hitler, Mus- 
solini, Franco, and Attaturk—to a system running on virtual automatic pilot. 
Similarly, by postdemocratic system I mean a society that has lost its grounded 
democratic processes—ranging from vital neighborhood institutions to na- 
tional political culture—in favor of the “automatic pilot” of media, commer- 
cial, and celebrity system requirements. 
Like its posttotalitarian counterpart, the postdemocratic system that was 
under assembly in the fifties, and that shifted into higher gear by the nineties, 
selects for an elite of cool-thinking functionaries, expanding their vegetative 
ways. Perhaps Microsoft Man would be a good term for this being, though the 
suggestion of a gender—male or female—however diminished, still seems be- 
yond the capacities of this neutered creature. If the fifties had its “organization 
man,” who pledged allegiance to his company, perhaps we have seen since the 
nineties the emergence of postorganization person, whose only allegiance is 
to the system in general, regardless of the particular company or country. 
The upper middle class and up has been becoming increasingly indepen- 
dent of both locale and public services through its money. Consider that 1 per- 
cent of American households own one-third of the private wealth, and the top 
20 percent a full 84 percent of it; that if one moves to general financial wealth, 
10 percent own about 80 percent of general financial wealth; and that average 
CEO pay (adjusted for inflation) between 1990 and 2005 skyrocketed almost 
300 percent. During the same period, production workers’ salaries increased 
a mere 4 percent, and, with inflation factored in, the federal minimum wage 
actually declined by 9 percent.4 Maximum wages soared, minimum wages 
suffered: the stairway to heaven got a lot longer. 
The advantaged class can claim it got there by its own rugged individual ef- 
fort, and that it is not racist, and in individual cases perhaps this can sometimes 
be the case. But the American elite are living increasingly in class-segregated 
enclaves, and their “public” school districts become means for class segrega- 




ideology of rugged individualism can become blindness, not only to how class 
structure imposes advantages and disadvantages unequally, but also to how 
much more than individual merit goes into living in a democracy. The basis of 
democracy is an inclusive common life, the opposite of exclusive distinction. 
As Christopher Lasch said in his book The Revolt of the Elites, “meritocracy 
is a parody of democracy. It offers opportunities for advancement, in theory 
at least, to anyone with the talent to seize them, but ‘opportunities to rise,’ as 
R. H. Tawney points out in Equality, ‘are no substitute for a general diffusion 
of the means of civilization,’ of the ‘dignity and culture’ that are needed by all 
‘whether they rise or not.’ ”5 
Lasch was not criticizing individual effort, the means by which many in 
America found ways to prosperity. His point was that meritocracy has be- 
come both a way for Americans to deny realities of class and one of the names 
for a deformation of democracy that gives up the local rootedness of life for 
the greater cosmopolitan Ladder of Success. “The meritocrat” also used to 
be called yuppie (though perhaps now, no longer “young,” the new acronym 
should be “uppie?”). I prefer BIG Zombie. 
Surveys on materialism, such as the Roper Center’s study of what people 
think constitute the good life, reveal material indicators, such as swimming 
pools, “a lot of money,” and “a job that pays more than average,” have in- 
creased while “quality of life” indicators, such as “happy marriage” or “inter- 
esting job,” have declined. In the same time period between 1975 and 1991 when 
dreams of material bounty increased, the percentage of people who think they 
can actually attain the good life declined from 35 to 23 percent.6 It seems that as 
people’s expectations for indicators of material wealth ballooned, that process 
was crowding out their expectations for actually living the good life. “Living 
large” has been replacing living well, and living large is proving to be a way of 
living unwell. 
Invasion of the Body Snatchers got it right, for alien vegetating forces were 
stalking Americans. Yet the aliens were neither McCarthy-era paranoia- 
induced communists nor vegetable pods from outer space, but literally veg- 
etable stalks from the mind of megatechnic America, which were en route in 
the second half of the twentieth century to absorb the American body. Through 
the progressive industrialization of corn products, and especially high fruc- 
tose corn syrup from 1980 on, Americans began to overconsume ever-greater 
amounts of corn-based products, from soda pop to corn-fed meats, so that, as 
Michael Pollan points out, the American body today incorporates more corn 
than the Mexican body (which has a more varied diet on average). As Berkeley 
biologist Todd Dawson told Pollan, “When you look at the isotope ratios, we 
North Americans look like corn chips with legs.”7 
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Corn, considered a traditional staple of the American diet, of healthy corn 
flakes, of traditional Native Americans who originally developed maize in 
Central America, was a key ingredient in the transformation to megatech- 
nic America, in the sugar-opiating of kids and adults through high fructose 
corn syrup and other corn-based sweeteners, and in the obesity and diabetes 
epidemics underway. Key to the expansion of corn culture was the decision to 
transform ammonium nitrate from the postwar munitions industry to fer- 
tilizer in 1947, setting the stage for radical increase in yield.8 Industrial corn 
culture is in this sense a direct product of the military-industrial complex. 
Corn has colonized the American body through corn-sugaring, corn-fed 
cowburgers, and through pervasive industrial corn-based food, producing an 
overweight population numbed by food. The invasion of the body snatchers, 
in short, has actually happened; only it was corn fused to the megatechnic 
complex that ripped open a new niche: the industrial eater, BIG Zombie, ca- 
pable of eating more and more. Consider that one-quarter of Americans eat 
fast food on any given day, that one in eight Americans are estimated to have 
worked for McDonald’s, or that, as Eric Schlosser reports in his book Fast Food 
Nation: “In 1970, Americans spent about $6 billion on fast food; in 2001, they 
spent more than $110 billion. Americans now spend more money on fast food 
than on higher education, personal computers, computer software, or new 
cars. They spend more on fast food than on movies, books, magazines, news- 
papers, videos, and recorded music—combined.”9 
BIG Zombie can live in the fantasies of the BIG McMansion in the gated 
surveillance community, the BIG SUV, the BIG amounts of mall-gotten gains, 
the BIG obese body from believing the “merit” system of overconsumption, 
and feel no responsibility to anything more than his or her BIG butt plunk- 
ing down in all of this excess, increasingly insulated from the common life. 
Meanwhile BIG Zombie Jr. is learning how to conform to the system properly, 
so that, clothed in the exquisite brands of success, Jr. will know how to press 
the merit buttons of the cage, and feel that he or she deserves all of these merit 
badges, and that those less privileged do not. 
One could take the various Star Trek TV series and movies as personifying 
this rootless elite, alienated from family, friends, and neighborhood, living 
in a purely artificial convenience enclosure, militaristic, progress oriented, 
and propelled by extreme, bewildering mobility. These are precisely the elites 
Lasch spoke of in The Revolt of the Elites and The Betrayal of Democracy: “Those 
who covet membership in the new aristocracy of brains tend to congregate on 
the coasts, turning their back on the heartland and cultivating ties with the 
international market in fast-moving money, glamour, fashion, and popular 
culture. It is a question of whether they think of themselves as Americans 
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at all  The new elites are at home only in transit, en route to a high-level 
conference, to the grand opening of a new franchise, to an international film 
festival, or to an undiscovered resort. Theirs is essentially a tourist’s view 
of the world—not a perspective likely to encourage a passionate devotion to 
democracy.”10 
Although the elite pictured by Star Trek grew more gender-equal and mul- 
ticultural over the years, not much changed regarding their alienation from 
their home planet or their colonizing—while appearing not to interfere— 
“prime directive.” What is their real prime directive? To extend the federation 
of machines. 
gear shift 
From Metropolis to Dark City: The Triumph of Post-Pottersville 
Metropolis: “Rotwang, give your robot this girl’s (Maria) likeness.” 
Fritz Lang’s classic silent film Metropolis was a remarkably prescient insight 
into the brain suck that characterizes our time, as well as the megamachine of 
modern life. Released in 1927, the story traces the path young Freder—son of 
the master of Metropolis Joh Fredersen—takes after seeing poor worker chil- 
dren. They are brought to the leisure gardens of the elite by Maria, who Freder 
falls for. He sets off to find out more and enters the undercity of factories, 
literally set below the surface, where he ends up changing places with a hap- 
less worker. The city is a haunting class structure literalized, with the workers’ 
city deep below factories, and cryptlike ruins below it. There, Maria counsels 
the workers in their suffering: “Between the brain that plans and the hands 
that build there must be a mediator.” Cut to Freder, hands beating on chest. 
Lang’s Metropolis can be viewed through numerous lenses. From a Marxist 
view Freder looks a lot like Freder-ick (Friedrich) Engels, who similarly came 
from the wealth of a Manchester factory his father co-owned to a passionate 
commitment to relieve the plight of workers. Engels moved from Germany in 
1842 as a twenty-two-year-old radical to work at a cotton mill his father co- 
owned, and which his father hoped would steer him away from his radicalism. 
While there Engels met Mary Burns, who introduced him to Manchester and 
to the plight of the English working class. He lived with her until her death in 
1862. 
Yet despite a revolt of the workers, resolution occurs through mediation, 
not Marxist overthrow. The hands of the workers and the head that is liter- 
ally the word “capital” meet in a final handshake between the foreman and 
End excerpt
